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PROTECTABLE TRADE DRESS WITHOUT SECONDARY
MEANING--ON SECOND THOUGHT
I. INTRODUCTION
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
addressed a conflict between the Circuit Courts of Appeals with respect to
the protectability of trade dress.2 Trade dress, a species of trademarks,3
has been defined as:
[A] complex composite of features. One may be size, another
may be color or color combinations, another may be texture,
another may be graphics and arrangement and so on. Trade dress
is a term reflecting the overall general impact, usually visual, but
sometimes also tactile, of all these features taken together.4
For example, trade dress has been held to include such features as "a
smooth back panel" of a medical cart;5 "engraved sentimental messages!"6
on greeting cards and a "four-sided freestanding rotating rack' ' used to
display the cards. Trade dress has also been held to include such features
as the visibility of food preparation areas in a restaurant8 and things such
as "stacked cartons of beer, produce and other items in the patron areas"9
of the restaurant. Trade dress has also covered features such as the
"general appearance of the exterior of [a] restaurant, the identifying sign,
the interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the menu, the equipment used to
serve food, the servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on the total
image of the restaurant."'1 Even "particular sales techniques" have been
considered trade dress.1
1. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
2. Id. at 2758-60.
3. Trade dress has been consistently interpreted as a subcategory of trademarks. See generally
Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1989); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2753 (1992); Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989); Roulo v.
Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989).
4. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1988).
5. Blue Bell Bio-Medical, 864 F.2d at 1255.
6. Roulo, 886 F.2d at 934.
7. Id. at 935.
8. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1987).
9. Id. at 839.
10. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2755 n.1.
11. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983).
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The issue addressed by the Court in Two Pesos involved a trademark
concept called "secondary meaning."12  "A trademark has a secondary
meaning if it 'has become so associated in the mind of the public with [an]
Sentity... or its product that it identifies the goods sold by that entity and
distinguishes them from goods sold by others.'...
Also central to the Court's opinion in Two Pesos was a trademark
notion termed "inherent distinctiveness." 4 Trademarks that are "inherent-
ly distinctive" are "those business symbols which are so distinctive in and
of themselves that legal protection is granted immediately upon adoption
and use" of such trademarks. 5
In Two Pesos, the Court attempted to resolve the conflict between the
Circuit Courts of Appeals with respect to whether "inherently distinctive"
trade dress, like "inherently distinctive" trademarks, can be afforded
automatic protection although lacking secondary meaning. As such, the
Court in Two Pesos framed the question simply as "whether proof of
secondary meaning 6 is essential to qualify an inherently distinctive17
trade dress for protection. . .. ""
The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Tenth and Federal Circuits have
answered the question affirmatively. 9 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
expressed doubts as to whether trade dress may be afforded protection
without a finding of secondary meaning.20 On the other hand, the Fifth,
12. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758.
13. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d
Cir. 1989) (quoting Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1162, 1166 (N.Y. 1977)).
14. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct at 2758.
15. 1 . THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEM S AND UNFAR COMPETmON § 16:2 (1973).
16. See discussion infra part H for the meaning of "secondary meaning." In summary, a
trademark may be protected if it "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods [or services]
in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1989). This acquired distinctiveness is called "secondary
meaning." Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
17. "Inherently distinctive" has been defined as "those business symbols which are so
distinctive in and of themselves that legal protection is granted immediately upon adoption and
use." 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 16:2.
18. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758.
19. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992); Hartford
House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988); Brunswick Corp. v.
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809
F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985); Litton
Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New
Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
20. Fuddruckers, Inc., 826 F.2d at 843-44.
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Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have answered the question in the nega-
tive.2" The Court in Two Pesos unanimously agreed with the Fifth Circuit
rule and held that trade dress does not need secondary meaning to come
under the protection of trademark law.'
This Note analyzes whether the Court's holding is well supported by
either the case law or the text of the statutes governing trademark law.'
The Note further discusses whether the Court's holding is well justified by
the purposes of trademark law.' The Note will thereafter examine the
failure of the Court to define what constitutes "inherent distinctiveness"
with respect to trade dress and whether it is in fact possible for trade dress
to be categorized similarly to trademarks; namely, whether it is possible to
categorize trade dress as generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary or
fanciful.' The Note will then argue that by not addressing these funda-
mental questions, Two Pesos does not clarify many of the problems of the
commercial world, and worse yet, the case injects new uncertainty into
trademark law.26 Finally, this Note will discuss the failure of the Court
to address another crucial question of whether trademark law protection of
an "inherently distinctive" trade dress undermines the carefully crafted
policies of patent law.'
II. BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK LAW
The primary purposes of trademark law are to "secure to the owner of
the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers."'  With minor
exceptions, trademarks remained a matter of common law 29 until the
21. See, e.g., Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1991);
Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (7th Cir.
1986); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
22. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761.
23. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 97-136 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 137-41, 177-81 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text.
28. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (citation omitted).
29. Se e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
1993]
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enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946,30 which established the current
statutory framework governing trademarks.1
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as including "any word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof used by any person ... to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown.
32
In order to identify its source, a trademark must distinguish itself from
other trademarks. Accordingly, trademarks have been classified based on
their utility in distinguishing their underlying goods or services. The more
distinctive a mark is, the better it identifies a particular source, and thus is
more readily afforded trademark protection.33 The categories of distinc-
tiveness, in the order of increasing distinctiveness, are (1) generic; (2)
descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; and (5) fanciful.' 4
A generic mark is one that serves to "'denominate a type, a kind, a
genus or a subcategory of goods."'35 For example, "Light Beer" and "Lite
Beer" have been held to be generic terms for low calorie beer.36 Generic
marks are not protected by trademark law.37
Descriptive marks directly describe a particular quality, function, or
characteristic of a product or service.3 1 For example, the term "Rock-
tobor" has been held to be descriptive of rock music broadcast in Octo-
ber.39 A descriptive mark may be protected under the Lanham Act if it
"has become distinctive of the applicant's goods [or services] in com-
merce."' This acquired distinctiveness is called "secondary meaning."'4
Thus, a descriptive term that invokes a particular source in the minds of the
30. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1989).
31. See, e.g., Park W Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 198.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1989).
33. See infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
34. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
35. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 997 (7th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (7th Cir. 1987)).
36. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977). cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1989).
38. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. The Gillette Co., No. 92-7718, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
1051, at *13 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1993) ("A descriptive mark describes a product's features, qualities,
or ingredients in ordinary language....:1.
39. Metromedia, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1989).
41. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
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consuming public has acquired secondary meaning and is therefore afforded
protection under the Lanham Act.42
Generic and descriptive trademarks are, by definition, not "inherently
distinctive." In other words, generic and descriptive marks are not
distinctive in and of themselves.43 Generic and descriptive marks "'forth-
with conveyr] an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteris-
tics of [their underlying] goods [or services]."'" Therefore, all generic
marks and those descriptive marks that lack secondary meaning fail to
identify their respective sources and are not afforded trademark protection.
The remaining three categories of trademarks, namely, suggestive,
arbitrary, and fanciful marks are, by definition, "inherently distinctive" and
thus protectable without proof of secondary meaning.45 "'A [mark] is
suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of goods." '46  An example of a suggestive
mark is the trademark "Roach Motel" for insect traps.47
An arbitrary mark, such as "Black and White" for scotch whiskey, is
one which is commonly used in the language, but one that has no
connection with the product.48 Arbitrary marks are also "inherently
distinctive" and are thus protected without proof of secondary meaning.
Finally, a fanciful mark, such as "Polaroid" for cameras, is one coined
for the purpose of serving as a trademark. 49 Fanciful marks, like sugges-
tive marks and arbitrary marks, are "inherently distinctive" and are
therefore protected without proof of secondary meaning.50
In sum, generic marks are, by definition, never "inherently distinctive"
and may never acquire secondary meaning and are therefore never protected
under trademark law.5 ' Descriptive marks are never "inherently distinc-
tive"; however, those descriptive marks which have acquired secondary
meaning are protected despite their lack of "inherent distinctiveness."52
42. Id; see generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARMY, TRADEMAMRS AND UNFAIR COMPEmION §
11.05 (3d ed. 1992).
43. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 11.01.
44. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v.
United Merchants & Mfts., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (SD.N.Y. 1968)).
45. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
46. Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Stix Prods.,
Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
47. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1978).
48. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1963).
49. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1963).
50. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 11.02.
51. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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Finally, suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks are, by definition,
"inherently distinctive" and are always protected whether or not they have
acquired secondary meaning.53
I. FACrS OF TWO PEsos, INC. V. TACo CABANA, INC.
Taco Cabana operates a chain of fastfood Mexican restaurants.' By
1985, Taco Cabana had opened a total of six restaurants, all in San
Antonio, Texas 5 Taco Cabana described its own trade dress as:
A festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas
decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The
patio includes interior and exterior areas with the interior patio
capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead
garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building is a festive
and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes.
Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme. 6
Two Pesos opened its first restaurant in December 1985, in Houston,
Texas, and thereafter expanded rapidly in that city.' "Iwo Pesos adopted
a motif essentially consistent with the above description of Taco Cabana's
trade dress . . . ."5 In 1986, Taco Cabana entered the Houston market 9
In 1987, Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trade dress infringement under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' The trial court instructed the jury that
53. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
54. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2755 (1992).
55. Id
56. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991).
57. Two Pesos, 112 S. CL at 2755.
58. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1117. Furthermore, an expert witness testified that 'raco
Cabana and Two Pesos are 'shaped the same. They look the same. When you're inside they
feel the same. They have the same product."' I& at 1117 n.l. Even Two Pesos, in Peti-
tioner's brief to the Supreme Court, admitted that "[t]here is little doubt in this case that Two
Pesos did in fact copy Taco Cabana's restaurant concept of an upscale fast-food, Mexican
restaurant with Mexican decor that also sells alcoholic beverages and has a drive-thru ....
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992)
(No. 91-971), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
59. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2755-56.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). This section provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to
enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
PROTECTABLE TRADE DRESS
"Taco Cabana's trade dress was protected if it either was inherently
distinctive or had acquired a secondary meaning."6' The jury determined
that Taco Cabana's "trade dress [was] inherently distinctive"'  but that
"the trade dress [had] not acquired a secondary meaning's in the Texas
market."' Thus, the trial court found that Taco Cabana's trade dress was
protected despite the lack of secondary meaning. 65 Accordingly, the trial
court awarded damages to Taco Cabana, stating that "Two Pesos had
intentionally and deliberately infringed Taco Cabana's trade dress." 66 The
Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court: "The weight of the evidence
persuades us... that Two Pesos brazenly copied Taco Cabana's successful
trade dress .... "67
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPiNION IN TWO PESOS
Justice White wrote for the unanimous Court in 7Wo Pesos."8 The
Court began by stating that "it is common ground that ... the general
principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham
Act" are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregis-
tered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a)."70 Thus, the Court
designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to
be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be
transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in
the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality
is situated, or by any person who believes that he is likely to be damaged by the use
of any such false description or representation.
This provision was amended by § 43(a) of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1989, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1989), after Taco Cabana filed its complaint against Two Pesos in the district
court. However, the substance of the statute was left essentially unchanged for the purposes of
this Note.
61. Two Pesos, 112 S. CL at 2756.
62. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
64. Two Pesos, 112 S. CL at 2756.
65. Id
66.1d
67. Id at 2756 n.5.
68. Id at 2755.
69. Lanham Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1989), generally lists conditions that preclude
trademarks from registration. For example, trademarks that consist of "immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter" are precluded from registration. Id § 1052(a). Similarly, marks that are
likely "to cause confusion" on the part of consumers are precluded from registration, id §
1052(d).
70. Two Pesos, 112 S. CL at 2757.
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implied that the Lanham Act protects a distinctive, though unregistered,
trademark to the same extent as the Lanham Act protects a registered
trademark. The Court reiterated that the basis for extending protection to
a mark is its degree of distinctiveness.7 The Court explained that a
trademark is entitled to protection if it is "capable of distinguishing the
applicant's good from those of others."' 2 The Court pointed out that, to
measure the capability of a mark to distinguish the applicant's goods,
"[mi]arks are often classified in categories of generally increasing distinc-
tiveness: ... (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or
(5) fanciful."
73
The Court went on to explain that "an identifying mark is [sufficiently]
distinctive and capable of being protected if it either (1) is inherently
distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary mean-
ing."74 Purporting to rely on both the text of the statute75 (section 43(a)),
and legislative intent,76 the Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit
"that proof of secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act where trade dress at issue is inherently
distinctive .... . 7
However, even the basic premise of the majority that "the general
principles qualifying a mark for registration ... are for the most part
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to
protection!' was challenged by the concurring opinions of both Justice
Stevens79 and Justice Thomas.80
Justice Stevens stated that:
rIThe text of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act ... does not mention
trademarks or trade dress. Nevertheless, the Court interprets this
section as having created a federal cause of action for infringe-
ment of an unregistered trademark or trade dress and concluded
that such a mark or dress should receive essentially the same




74. Ua at 2758 (emphasis in the original).
75. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760.
76. I4
77. Id. at 2761.
78. Id at 2757.
79. id at 2761-66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. Two Pesos, 112 S. CL at 2766-67 (Thomas, L, concurring).
81. Id at 2761 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens continued by explaining that "[t]he full text of the
section makes it clear that the word 'origin' refers to the geographic
location in which the goods originated, and in fact, the phrase 'false
designation of origin' was understood to be limited to false advertising of
geographic origin."' He further stated that "it is important to recognize
that the meaning of the text [of section 43(a)] has been transformed by the
federal courts over the past few decades." 3 Justice Stevens pointed out
that "the lower courts' expansion of the [scope of] § 43(a) is unsupported
by the text of the [Lanham] Act ... ."4 Regarding congressional intent
behind the enactment of section 43(a), Justice Stevens stated that "Congress
has not specifically addressed the question whether secondary meaning is
required under § 43(a) .... ."'
Justice Stevens conceded that section 43(a) does not even imply that
secondary meaning is not required for protection of an "inherently
distinctive" trade dress. Nevertheless, he agreed with the "lower courts'
expansion!" of the scope of section 43(a) because such expansion was
"consistent with the general purposes of the [Lanham] Act.""
Justice Thomas also criticized the basic premise set forth by the
majority that "the principles that qualify a mark for registration under § 2
of the Lanham Act apply as well to determining whether an unregistered
mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a)."' Justice Thomas stated that
the "Court terms that [basic premise] 'common ground,' though it fails to
explain why that might be so .... .""
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN TWO PESOS
A. The Court's Cursory Analysis of the Text
and the Purpose of the Lanham Act
The criteria for protectability and infringement of trade dress are
essentially not derived from the text of the Lanham Act. Indeed, the
Court's opinion in Two Pesos, while attempting to portray trade dress as a
82. 1d1 at 2762.
83. Id. at 2761.
84. Id. at 2764.
85. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2765 (Stevens, J.. concurring).
86. Id. at 2764.
87. Id.
88. Two Pesos, 112 S. CL at 2766 (Thomas, J., concurring).
89. Id.
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plain trademark, makes it apparent that the standard for protectability of
trade dress is not specified in the text of the Lanham Act. In fact, the
disparate treatment of trade dress and trademarks is evident from the
provisions of the Lanham Act itself. For example, trade dress is not
eligible for registration on either the Principle Register ' or the Supple-
mental Register.9'
Thus, unlike the protection that the Lanham Act affords to registered
trademarks, no equivalent protection is provided for trade dress in the text
of the Lanham Act. Section 43(a), under which the present action was
brought, does not even allude to the term "trade dress." Therefore, any
standards that courts contrive for protection of trade dress must stem either
from legislative intent or from pure judicial creation.
The Two Pesos Court performed a very cursory analysis of both the
case law and the legislative intent in approving the Fifth Circuit's standard
for protection of trade dress. 2 The Court's entire rationale in holding that
secondary meaning is unnecessary for a trade dress to be afforded
trademark protection was contained in two sentences: "Mhe protection of
trademark and trade dress under § 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose
of preventing deception and unfair competition. There is no persuasive
reason to apply different analysis to the two."93
This reasoning is insufficient and inaccurate. Ironically, the majority
itself stated that "section [43(a)] does not mention trademarks or trade
dress, whether they be called generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, [or]
fanciful .... ,I9 Moreover, even if legislative intent dictates that section
43(a) applies to trade dress as well as to trademarks, and even if the
statutory purpose of section 43(a) is to prevent deception and unfair
competition, the conclusion that the standards of protection of trademarks
should or can be equally applied to trade dress does not follow. The
fundamental differences between trademarks and trade dress militate against
the spontaneous application of certain trademark standards to trade dress.95
With respect to the statutory purpose of section 43(a), the Court further
stated that "[p]rotection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves
the Act's purpose to 'secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among
90. Lanham Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1989).
91. Lanham Act, § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1989).
92. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760-61.
93. Id. at 2760.
94. Id
95. See infra part V.C.
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competing producers ... ."'" This rationale begs the question-what
type of trade dress does in fact enable "consumers to distinguish among
competing producers?" Indeed, the question addressed in this case is not
whether trade dress should be protected, but rather what type of a trade
dress should be protected. Specifically, should protection be extended to
a trade dress that lacks secondary meaning, albeit the dress is "inherently
distinctive?" The Court failed to address a fundamental question as to how
one determines what types of trade dress are "inherently distinctive."
B. What Constitutes an "Inherently Distinctive" Trade Dress
The Two Pesos Court did not define what constitutes "inherent distinc-
tiveness" with respect to trade dress." The Court simply imposed the
concept of "inherent distinctiveness" on trade dress analysis as that concept
is understood in the trademark domain. This dual application of the
concept of "inherent distinctiveness" does not, however, bridge the real gap
between the two spheres of trademarks and trade dress.
With respect to trademarks, the concept of "inherent distinctiveness"
is well understood. Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful trademarks are, by
definition, "inherently distinctive."98 Conversely, generic and descriptive
marks are, by definition, not "inherently distinctive."" Professor
McCarthy1" has defined marks that are "inherently distinctive" as:
Those business symbols which are so distinctive in and of
themselves that legal protection is granted immediately upon
adoption and use. For example, such symbols are fanciful and
arbitrary marks, as well as non-descriptive suggestive marks ....
Such inherently distinctive words and symbols do not require
proof of secondary meaning for protection."1
Different courts may classify the same mark under different categories.
However, at the very least, it should be recognized by these courts that a
trademark is an identifiable set of symbols, words, or letters that is
associated with the underlying goods or services. The main idea of
trademark is that consumers can readily recognize that a certain mark
96. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
97. See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
100. J. Thomas McCarthy is a professor of law at University of San Francisco.
101. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 16:2.
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attaches to certain goods or services. It is from this point of departure that
one may argue that a mark, in addition to representing certain goods or
services, is "inherently distinctive" since it does not "'forthwith conveyfl
an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of [the
underlying] goods [or services].""'
However, a parallel line of argument with respect to trade dress is
almost impossible. As previously stated, the Tenth Circuit has explained
that:
Trade dress is a complex composite of features. One may be
size, another may be color or color combinations, another may be
texture, another may be graphics and arrangement and so on.
Trade dress is a term reflecting the overall general impact, usually
visual, but sometimes also tactile, of all these features taken
together.
10 3
Another court has defined trade dress as "a commonly used term in the
law of unfair competition which denotes the form in which a producer
presents his brand to the market; thus a label, package, even the cover of
a book might be trade dress.""''
It is difficult to imagine how such a complex set of features may be
categorized as generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.
Indeed, the lower courts have attested to the difficulty of utilizing the
concept of "inherent distinctiveness" in the trade dress arena both by
express statements and by inconsistent and unprincipled application of the
concept to the facts before them.'0 5
C. Difficulty of the Lower Courts in Deciding What Constitutes
an "Inherently Distinctive" Trade Dress
An analysis of lower court decisions reveals the difficulties courts face
in deciding whether a trade dress is "inherently distinctive." To determine
what types of trade dress are "inherently distinctive," lower courts have
generally used either the Fifth Circuit's test formulated in Chevron
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc."'6 (the "Chevron"
test) or the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' test
102. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting
Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Sipp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
103. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1988).
104. Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986).
105. See infra part V.C.
106. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981).
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developed in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd.1'7 (the
"Seabrook" test).'08
Under the Chevron test, trade dress is "inherently distinctive" if its
features "are arbitrary and serve no function either to describe the product
or assist in its effective packaging ....
Under the alternative test developed in Seabrook, the inquiry is
whether the trade dress is
a common basic shape or design, whether it [is] unique or
unusual in a particular field, or whether it [is] a mere refinement
of commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for
a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or
ornamentation for the goods .... "'
Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc. illustrates a typical application of
both the Chevron and Seabrook tests.' The court in Blue Coral applied
the two tests in deciding whether the trade dress at issue was "inherently
distinctive."' 12  Blue Coral involved a trade dress of a wheel cleaning
product named "Wheel Magic." ' Wheel Magic was a universal wheel
cleaning product which was designed to clean different types of wheels." 4
After Blue Coral introduced Wheel Magic to the market, Turtle Wax, a
competitor of Blue Coral in the automotive appearance chemical mar-
ket, " 5 introduced its own universal wheel cleaner called the 'Turtle Wax
All Purpose Cleaner."' 6
Applying the Chevron test, the court stated that "the purely arbitrary
features of the Wheel Magic['s trade dress] are the green color of the
liquid, cap, and label; the clear plastic of the bottle and its actual shape;
107. 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
108. See, e.g., Turtle Wax, Inc. v. Frst Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1318-22 (N.D. III.
1991) (applying both the Chevron and the Seabrook tests); Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc.,
664 F. Supp. 1153, 1160-62 (N.D. 111. 1987) (applying both the Chevron and the Seabrook tests);
AmBR1T, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 979 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (applying both the Chevron and
the Seabrook tests); Wiley v. American Greetings Corp., 762 F.2d 139, 141 (1st Cir. 1985)
(applying the Seabrook test).
109. Chevron Chemical, 659 F.2d at 702.
110. Seabrook Foods, 568 F.2d at 1344.
111. Blue Coral, 664 F. Supp. at 1160-62.
112. Id. at 1160.
113. Id at 1155.
114. Id. "Wheel Magic" was designed to be an all-in-one wheel cleaning product. As
such, the product was designed as a cleaner for mag wheels, wire and chrome wheels,
aluminum painted wheels, and custom and coated wheels. Id at 1155 n.2.
115. Id. at 1154.
116. Blue Coral, 664 F. Supp. at 1157.
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and the size of the lettering."117 The court went on to express that "[t]he
use of the high tech grid [in Wheel Magic's trade dress] is descriptive of
the advanced high tech nature of the product."
118
The difficulties in using the Chevron test are apparent from the bizarre
result reached by the Blue Coral court. On the one hand, the court held
that "the clear plastic bottle," ordinarily thought of as an obvious choice for
a container of a cleaning product, is "purely arbitrary" and thus "inherently
distinctive" under the Chevron test."9 On the other hand, the court
reached the even more enigmatic conclusion that "the high tech grid is
descriptive" and therefore not "inherently distinctive."'"2 To reach this
conclusion, the court reasoned that:
A term or feature is merely descriptive if it specifically describes
a characteristic or an ingredient of a product. The finding that
the high tech look is descriptive and not arbitrary rests upon Blue
Coral's representation that Wheel Magic is indeed an advanced
high tech formula. If Wheel Magic is not an advanced high tech
formula and is nothing more than Clear Magic with green
coloring, it may be the case that a high tech look would only be
arbitrary and not descriptive. Absent such proof, the high tech
look is descriptive in this case.'
Thus, the Blue Coral court penalized the trade dress owner for having
an "advanced high tech formula," since the court would have apparently
held that the "high tech look" of the trade dress was "inherently distinctive"
if the "Wheel Magic [was] not an advanced high tech formula."'" Such
dubious results under the Chevron test are not surprising since the test only
prescribes that a trade dress must be "arbitrary" in order to be "inherently
distinctive," without supplying any guidance as to how to decide whether
a trade dress is "arbitrary." As such, the test merely switches the label
"inherently distinctive" with the label "arbitrary."
The alternative test enunciated in Seabrook fares a little better than the
Chevron test because of its specificity. However, even the Seabrook test
does not provide a principled method to ascertain what types of trade dress
are "inherently distinctive." In essence, the test turns upon a determination




121. Blue Coral, 664 F. Supp. at 1160 n.10 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). "Clear
Magic" was a predecessor to "Wheel Magic." Id at 1158.
122. Id. at 1160 n.10.
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of whether the trade dress is "common, '"' 3 "unique, ' 1 4 or a "mere
refinement of commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation
for a particular class of goods."'" These labels do not furnish a readily
applicable analytical framework necessary to grant protection to "a complex
composite of features," which include "the overall general impact? of many
"features taken together."'" For example, applying the Seabrook test, the
Blue Coral court said that "[o]ther than the use of a clear bottle, we do not
find that the Wheel Magic trade dress is all that different than other wheel
care products on the market." 7 It is therefore manifest that the applica-
tion of the Seabrook test, at bottom, depends upon whether the court finds
the trade dress at issue is "all that different" from other trade dress used for
a "particular class of goods."1
In sum, neither the Chevron test nor the Seabrook test employs an
objective method of determining whether the trade dress at issue is
sufficiently "inherently distinctive" to serve the source identifying function
that a trade dress must perform to be entitled to trademark protection."'
It follows that both the Chevron and Seabrook tests desperately require a
case-by-case analysis to determine what types of trade dress are "arbitrary"
or "different" enough to be afforded trademark protection. Furthermore,
neither the Chevron test nor the Seabrook test makes an objective inquiry
whether the trade dress at issue is viewed by the public as representing a
particular source. It is therefore very likely that due to the absence of any
definitive or methodic approach in determining the "inherent distinctive-
ness" of a particular trade dress, different courts would reach opposite
results on the question whether a particular trade dress is "inherently
distinctive."
To be sure, resort to subjective inquiries similar to the ones proposed
by the Chevron and Seabrook tests is not limited to trade dress questions.
Courts have often employed similar subjective inquiries to determine
whether a trademark (as opposed to a trade dress) is "inherently distinc-
123. Chevron Chemical, 659 F.2d at 702.
124. Id.
125. Seabrook Foods, 568 F.2d at 1344.
126. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Furthermore, see infra notes 191-96 and
accompanying text relating to the more precise standards employed to deny design patent
protection to designs that may well qualify for trade dress protection under the imprecise
standards of Chevron or Seabrook.
127. Blue Coral, 664 F. Supp. at 1162.
128. See supra notes 110, 127 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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tive." 3° However, as the Blue Coral court cautioned, there are critical
differences between applicability of the "inherently distinctive" concept to
trademarks and the applicability of the concept to trade dress. The Blue
Coral court asserted that an "inherently distinctive" trademark is protected
because:
The mark has no meaning absent the use by the originator of the
mark. With trademarks it is fairly easy to determine what is an
"inherently distinctive" trademark. For example, the use of
Exxon or Kodak as a company name is "inherently distinctive."
These are made-up words that had no meaning until a company
decided to use them. Thus, if a second comer tried to use a name
confusingly similar, it would be unfair competition. It is a fairly
simple process to compare one arbitrary made-up name with
another arbitrary made-up name. The process is not that simple
when it applies to comparing one trade dress with another. A
complete trade dress can be made up of many different function-
all" elements such as a bottle, a spray cap, and a label. It may
also be made up of many descriptive elements .... The trade
dress may also incorporate truly arbitrary elements .... Thus,
we are to take these many varied elements and decide if together
they create an inherently distinctive trade dress. This is not as
easy of a process as comparing one arbitrary made-up word with
another.'32
Thus, not only do the Chevron and Seabrook tests lack clarity in
defining "inherently distinctive" trade dress, but the application of the
concept of "inherent distinctiveness" to trade dress is also intrinsically more
complex than the application of the concept to trademarks.
The difficulty in applying the concept of "inherent distinctiveness" to
trade dress was further illustrated in Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands
Corp.133 There, the court addressed the question whether the trade dress
used for Liquid Crystal, a cleaning product, was "inherently distine-
130. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
131. "Functionality" is a defense used to justify infringement of a protected trademark or
trade dress. As the court stated in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176
(7th Cir. 1989): "For purposes of a defense against trade dress infringement, 'functional'
means not simply that the feature serves a function, but that the feature is necessary to afford
a competitor the means to compete effectively." Id. at 1188. Therefore, for a successful
infringement claim, a trade dress must be both protectable and nonfunctional.
132. Blue Coral, 664 F. Supp. at 1163.
133. 781 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Ml. 1991).
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tive.' "' In applying the Seabrook test, the court made the following
statements:
Although [the Magistrate-Judge] found the individual elements of
plaintiff's trade dress to be commonplace in the industry, the
Magistrate-Judge did note that no product possessed those same
elements in [a similar] combination. According to Turtle Wax,
this finding compelled the conclusion that the Liquid Crystal trade
dress was new and unique .... Presumably, it could be said
about the trade dress of any new product that no competitive
product combines precisely the same elements in its trade dress.
Essentially, that is all the Magistrate-Judge found in this case.
However, that fact alone does not make the product's trade dress
inherently distinctive. Any other rule essentially would require
a finding of inherent distinctiveness whenever a new product
enters the market. 35
Thus, according to the court in Turtle Wax, a unique combination
alone does not make for an "inherently distinctive" trade dress. This
finding, however, is in direct contradiction with the language of the
Seabrook test, affording protection to designs or shapes that are unique and
uncommon. 3 Therefore, it is evident that the concept of "inherent
distinctiveness" cannot be easily imported from the trademark sphere to the
trade dress domain.
VI. PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF REQUIRING SECONDARY MEANING
FOR "INHERENTLY DISTnCrIVE" TRADE DRESS
A. The Requirement of Secondary Meaning Avoids the Subjectivity
of Determining "Inherent Distinctiveness"
The Second and Tenth Circuits have always required a finding of
secondary meaning for protection of a trade dress, regardless of whether the
dress is "inherently distinctive."' 37  In Laureyssens v. Idea Group
Inc.," the Second Circuit, referring to the language of section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, explained:
134. Id. at 1316, 1318.
135. Id. at 1321.
136. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
138. 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Where there is no actual secondary meaning in a trade dress, the
purchasing public simply does not associate the trade dress with
a particular producer. Therefore, a subsequent producer who
adopts an imitating trade dress will not cause confusion, mistake,
or deception as to the "origin, sponsorship, or approval" of the
goods. Second, a junior producer's use of imitating trade dress
bears no "false designation of origin" because, in the absence of
secondary meaning in the senior producer's trade dress, the
imitating trade dress suggests no particular origin to the consum-
ing public .... The secondary meaning requirement exists to
insure that something worth protecting exists-an association that
has developed in the purchasing public's mind between a
distinctive trade dress and its producer-before trademark law
applies to limit the freedom of a competitor to compete by
copying. The imitation or even complete duplication of another's
product or packaging creates no risk of confusion unless some
aspect of the duplicated appearance is identified with a particular
source .... "Absent confusion, imitation of certain successful
features in another's product is not unlawful and to that extent a
'free ride' is permitted."
139
Further, the court in Blue Coral" reiterated some of the concerns
of the Laureyssens court with respect to why a finding of secondary
meaning is a desirable requirement in extending trademark protection to an
"inherently distinctive" trade dress:
Trade dress protection is much more extensive than trademark
protection. Trademark protection is limited to comparing just one
aspect of a plaintiff's product with one aspect of the defendant's
product, that is, the use of the trademarks. For trade dress
infringement we are to compare the overall impression of the two
trade dresses. The idea behind such extensive protection is to
prevent a second comer from free riding on the first corner's
efforts to win consumers. In order to insure that this extensive
protection is properly used, the first comer has to prove the
existence of secondary meaning. That is, that the consuming
public had come to identify the first comer's trade dress with the
first comer .... Obviously, if the consuming public had never
come to associate the first comer's trade dress with the first
139. Id. at 137-38 (citations omitted) (quoting Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960)).
140. Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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comer, the consuming public would not be unfairly confused
when the second comer put its product on the market even if that
product was confusingly similar to the first corner's.' 4'
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also approved the
approach taken by the Second Circuit in requiring a plaintiff to establish
that his or her trade dress has acquired secondary meaning. 42 In Cicena
Ltd v. Columbia Telecomm Group, the Federal Circuit asserted that:
In a trade dress infringement suit under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, the Second Circuit requires the plaintiff to establish that his
trade dress has acquired secondary meaning. This requirement
follows naturally from the language of § 43(a), which offers
redress for "false designation of origin." If the plaintiff cannot
show that his trade dress has acquired secondary meaning, i.e.,
that "the purchasing public associates that dress with a single
producer or source rather than just with the product itself," then
use of that trade dress by a competitor will not designate any
origin and there is no violation of § 43(a). 43
In addition to the above arguments premised on the proposition that
a requirement of secondary meaning insures that "something worth
protecting exists,"'" requiring secondary meaning replaces the somewhat
intuitive Chevron and Seabrook tests with the pragmatic, well-developed,
and objective test of secondary meaning. The Chevron and Seabrook tests
pivot on the inquiry whether the trade dress at issue is sufficiently
"arbitrary" or "different" to be afforded trademark protection. 4 The test
for defining secondary meaning is, however, much more objective. As
explained by professor McCarthy, the plaintiff can establish secondary
meaning by showing that "the public is aware that the product comes from
a single, though anonymous source.'" In determining whether a mark
has acquired secondary meaning, the courts consider both "direct evi-
dence' 47 and "circumstantial evidence."'"
141. Id at 1162-63 (citations omitted).
142. See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1549
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
143. Id at 1548-49.
144. Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 138.
145. See supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
146. See 1J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETMroN § 15:1 (2d ed.
1984).
147. See, e.g., Vaughn Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987).
148. Id
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Under "direct evidence," factors such as direct consumer testimony and
consumer surveys on whether the consumers are "aware that the product
comes from a single, though anonymous source" are considered.
49
Under "circumstantial evidence," factors such as the exclusivity, length, and
manner of use; amount and manner of advertising; amount of sales and
number of customers; established place in the market; and proof of
intentional copying are considered to determine whether "the public is
aware that the product comes from a single, though anonymous
source."' 50 Although the test of what constitutes secondary meaning set
forth above does not embody mathematical accuracy, it can set much more
accurate guidelines than those provided for in the Chevron and Seabrook
tests.
B. Lower Court Decisions Illustrate the Desirability of the
Objective Requirement of Secondary Meaning
The following is an illustration of how the requirement of secondary
meaning results in a more methodic and desirable approach than the
approaches taken by Chevron or Seabrook in determining protectability of
trade dress. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., ' the
court considered whether the trade dress for the over-the-counter analgesic
"EXCEDRIN PM' had acquired secondary meaning. 52 After stating that
the trade dress of a product may be eligible for trademark protection only
if it has acquired a secondary meaning, the court examined whether the
trade dress for "EXCEDRIN PM" had in fact acquired such meaning.
The court first recounted that "'[i]n order to establish that trade dress
has acquired a secondary meaning, the plaintiff must show that the
purchasing public associates goods designated by [the trade dress] with a
particular source.' 1, 53 The court then stated that "[piroving secondary
meaning entails vigorous evidentiary requirements .... [A] plaintiff should
attempt to offer evidence of consumer studies and successful advertising.
Additionally, a finding that the defendant intentionally copied the plaintiff's
mark 'could also be persuasive, if not conclusive, evidence of consumer
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 786 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
152. Id. at 192.
153. Id at 195 (quoting Tripledge Prods., Inc. v. Whitney Resources, Ltd., 735 F. Supp. 1154,
1161-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)).
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recognition and good will."' "' The court further stated that, in determin-
ing whether a trade dress has established secondary meaning, courts should
consider factors such as "proof of sales success, advertising expenditures,
unsolicited media coverage of the product, consumer surveys, intentional
copying of the product, and length and exclusivity of the product in the
market."155  It noted that "[t]he plaintiff need not establish all of the
factors, and no one particular factor is dispositive.""'
The court next applied some of the above factors to the facts at bar:
"In terms of advertising expenditures, Bristol-Myers presented evidence that
it has expended in excess of $81 million in advertising and promoting
EXCEDRIN PM over the past twenty years .... In addition, sales of
EXCEDRIN PM have exceeded $300 million .... ." The court further
stated that "the defendant [McNeil] acknowledges that the recognition factor
[of EXCEDRIN PM was] 87.9% when consumers were asked in a Gallop
poll if they had ever heard of EXCEDRIN PM." ' The court then
concluded that it found "the testimony and documentary evidence sufficient
to meet the standard articulated by the Second Circuit in [Thompson
Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc.59] with regard to advertising expenditures,
consumer recognition and sales success."'6'°
Next, the court applied the length and exclusivity of use factors of the
secondary meaning test. It pointed out that "If]rom 1969 to 1990, Bristol-
Myers has continuously and exclusively produced EXCEDRIN PM as an
analgesic with a sleep aid and has been the only such product on the
market."' 61 Then, the court explained that "the most persuasive Thomp-
son Medical factor is the finding that McNeil has intentionally copied the
EXCEDRIN PM trade dress."1 62 With regard to the evidence of inten-
tional copying, the court stated:
There is no doubt that McNeil was aware of the EXCEDRIN PM
mark and trade dress when it implemented its plan to enter the
154. Bristol-Myers, 786 .F. Supp. at 195 (quoting 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-
Stardust, Inc., 815 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1987)).
155. Id.
156. Id at 195. It is noted that the test for secondary meaning articulated by the Bristol-
Myers court is the conventional test for secondary meaning that was introduced previously in
this Note. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
157. Bristol-Myers, 786 F. Supp. at 196.
158. Id.
159. 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985).
160. Bristol-Myers, 786 F. Supp. at 196.
161. Id. at 196-97.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
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"analgesic-with-sleep-aid" market.... Traditionally TYLENOL
products, and in particular the analgesic items, have been
marketed in a trade dress consisting of three predominant colors:
red, yellow and white, with intermittent type face in black.
McNeil abandoned this "family-of-products" color scheme when
it introduced TYLENOL PM in 1991 .... McNeil surveyed
EXCEDRIN PM customers in order to develop a marketing
strategy for TYLENOL PM. [Furthermore,] McNeil personnel
discussed the similarity of certain elements between EXCEDRIN
PM and TYLENOL PM. 63
After carefully analyzing the testimony of McNeil's key witnesses, the
court "question[ed] the lack of McNeil documents related to the packaging
and design decisions in the creation of TYLENOL PM."" The court
also pointed out that "[a] review of the approximately sixty separate
package mockups reveals that multiple options were presented to McNeil
in terms of color and design... which would have moved its final product
much further along the spectrum away from the EXCEDRIN PM trade
dress."'' Based on all the evidence, such as the testimony of key
witnesses of McNeil and the lack of documentation by McNeil, the court
found that "[a]n analysis of the logotype, graphic devices and color
configuration of the EXCEDRIN PM and TYLENOL PM packages leads
to the inescapable conclusion that the defendant intentionally copied
Bristol-Myers' analgesic-with-sleep-aid trade dress." 1"
Therefore, based on factors such as advertising expenditure, consumer
recognition, sales success, length and exclusivity of use, and intentional
copying by the defendant, the court concluded that plaintiff's EXCEDRIN
PM trade dress had in fact acquired secondary meaning. 67
From the above example presented by the Bristol-Myers case, it is
apparent that the conventional test for secondary meaning is much more
objective and structured than the standards used to determine "inherent
distinctiveness" of trade dress as demonstrated by the Blue Coral case.
The objectivity and structure of the secondary meaning test is based
upon the fact that all of the factors used to determine the existence of
secondary meaning are ascertainable by presentation of evidence on both
sides of the issue. The question is then reduced to whether the plaintiff has
163. Id. at 203-04.
164. Bristol-Myers, 786 F. Supp. at 204 (citation omitted).
165. Bristol-Myers, 786 F. Supp. at 206.
166. Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 197.
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carried its burden of proof in showing that the factors for establishing
secondary meaning have been met.'o
In contrast, the Seabrook and Chevron tests entail an analysis which.
is too subjective and unstructured. This is because the two tests call for a
determination of whether the trade dress at issue is sufficiently "arbitrary"
or sufficiently "different" from a competing trade dress. One commentator
appropriately summed up the desirability of the secondary meaning
requirement by stating:
To say that the overall design of a useful article is "inherently
distinctive" of a particular source just by examining it and
perhaps dissecting it, seems to me an impermissible exercise of
intuitive judging. It substitutes an impression that the design is
outstanding, or eccentric, or clever, or something, for the proofs
of association with a source, gained in the marketplace, that add
up to a showing of secondary meaning."6 9
C. The Analytical Framework Applicable to Trademarks Cannot and
Should Not be Imported to Trade Dress Area
If, as the Supreme Court'held in Two Pesos, a trade dress may be
distinctive even in the absence of secondary meaning, the resultant lack of
objectivity discussed above can cause a serious nonuniformity in application
of trademark concepts such as "genericness," "descriptiveness" and
"suggestiveness" to trade dress problems. For example, according to the
Chevron and Seabrook tests, a trade dress is "inherently distinctive" if it is
"arbitrary' ' 70 or "unique.'' Yet these concepts are unprincipled and
subjective. 2 Thus, as illustrated by the court's opinion in Blue Coral,
different courts may reach opposite results on the question whether a
particular trade dress is "inherently distinctive."'73 If a court decides that
a particular dress is not "inherently distinctive," the dress must be labeled
168. These factors, as previously stated, are: (1) consumer surveys demonstrating that the
product comes from a single, though anonymous source; (2) the exclusivity, length, and
manner of use of the trade dress; (3) amount and manner of advertising of the trade dress; (4)
amount of sales and number of customers of the product; (5) established place of the product
in the market; and (6) proof of intentional copying of the trade dress by the defendant. See
supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
169. Ralph S. Broun, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1380 (1987).
170. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
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as either "generic" or "descriptive.""7 4 However, such labels lose their
meaning when removed from trademarks and are applied to trade dress.
For example, regarding "genericness," what type of trade dress would
"serve to denominate a type, kind, a genus or a subcategory" 1" of a
Mexican restaurant? Likewise, with respect to being "descriptive," what
kind of trade dress would "directly describe the particular quality, function,
or characteristic"7 6 of a Mexican restaurant?
These questions were not touched by the Supreme Court in its decision
in Two Pesos. Nevertheless, the answers to these questions are essential if
the Court is to apply trademark concepts to trade dress. If a trade dress is
not "inherently distinctive," it must be found generic or descriptive. Yet,
if one cannot independently define what constitutes a "generic" or
"descriptive" trade dress, then the analytical framework of "generic,"
"descriptive" or "inherently distinctive" trademarks cannot and should not
be imported to trade dress domain. In other words, if a court finds that a
certain trade dress is not "inherently distinctive," and at the same time the
court finds it impossible to determine whether the trade dress is generic or
descriptive, then how can the court possibly characterize the trade dress?
This crucial analytical gap is a major shortcoming in the Two Pesos.
decision.
D. The Requirement of Secondary Meaning Ensures that the Public Has
Notice of the Protected Status of a Trade Dress
Another significant difference between a trademark and a trade dress
necessitates that the latter acquire secondary meaning before it is afforded
protection. Under the Lanham Act, trademarks may be registered on either
the "Principle Register" 1" or the "Supplemental Register.' ' 178 Registra-
tion on either Register provides notice to the potential infringer and thus
prevents an inadvertent infringement. This is desirable since businesses can
avoid costly consequences of adopting a potentially infringing trademark.
In contrast to trademarks, no such mechanism of providing notice to
174. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
177. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1053 (1989) (allowing registration for trademarks
that are "distinctive").
178. See generally 15 U.S.C. §1091 (1989) (allowing registration for trademarks "capable
of distinguishing applicant's goods or services" which are not, due to their present lack of
distinctiveness, registrable on the principle register).
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the business community exists in relation to an "inherently distinctive"
trade dress. In other words, there is no Register to which a business
planner may refer in order to investigate the wisdom of investing in the
creation of a certain trade dress. Thus, a business may find itself entangled
in litigation which could have been easily avoided had there been a
Register on which an "inherently distinctive" trade dress were registered.
For example, the investments that Two Pesos had made in its restaurants
and the expenses of litigation incurred by both Two Pesos and Taco Cabana
could have been easily avoided if Taco Cabana's trade dress had been
registered.
Of course, it is impractical, if not impossible, to "register" trade dress.
Trade dress represents such things as "the overall general impact, usually
visual, but sometimes also tactile" for a "complex composite of fea-
tures." '179 The various definitions and uses of the phrase "trade dress"
further attest to the difficulty, or impossibility, of maintaining a trade dress
on a public "Register" in order to provide notice of its protected status to
the business community.18 Indeed, even what courts have recognized as
trade dress is often extremely difficult to maintain on a public "Register"
such as the Principal Register that exists for trademarks. 181
Accordingly, the inability to provide notice of the protected status of
a trade dress to the business community is another significant reason why
secondary meaning should be required. Secondary meaning would ensure
that the public view the trade dress as a source identifier before that dress
may be afforded trademark protection. As such, much of the need to
provide public notice would be automatically fulfilled by the requirement
of secondary meaning.
179. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
180. For example, the court in Joh H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966
(IIth Cir. 1983) included "even particular sales techniques" in the definition of trade dress. Id.
at 980.
181. The following cases exemplify that a trade dress is often not amenable to "registration":
Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989) (trade dress covered such
features as "a smooth back panel instead of a corrugated back panel" of a medical cart); Roulo
v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990) (trade
dress included "engraved sentimental messages" on greeting cards and a "four-sided freestanding
rotating rack" used to display the cards); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d
837 (9th Cir. 1987) (trade dress included the visibility of food preparation areas in a restaurant
and things such as "stacked cartons of beer, produce and other items in the patron areas").
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VII. THE RESULT IN TWO PESOS CIRCUMVENTS THE CAREFULLY
BALANCED POLICIES OF THE PATENT LAWS
The Court in T1vo Pesos was conspicuously silent on the issue of the
relation between the carefully developed policies of the patent laws and the
resolution of the trade dress question before the Court. However, on many
previous occasions, the Court has demonstrated its concern that the
amorphous and wavering "standards" used to grant trade dress protection
do not impinge upon the cautious balance struck by the federal patent
laws."82 For example, the Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc."8 3 analyzed, in considerable depth, the policies of patent laws
and their relation to trade dress protection. The Court began by reciting the
constitutional grant of power to Congress to "promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." '  The Court went on to state that:
The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to
encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which
stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the
"Progress of Science and useful Arts." As we have noted in the
past, the Clause contains both a grant of power and certain
limitations. upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not
create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it
"authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available." From their inception, the
federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the
need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and
refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself
and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy."
The Court further asserted that "[tihe federal patent scheme creates a
limited opportunity to obtain a property right in an idea."' 86 The Court
182. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Comco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964).
183. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
184. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
185. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383
U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
186. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
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then characterized patents as limited "legal monopolies" that are granted to
inventors in exchange for lifting "the veil of secrecy" from their work.18
7
The glaring shortcoming in the Two Pesos decision is the Court's
oversight of the vital characteristic of the patent laws. The "opportunity to
obtain a property right in an idea" is limited and not everlasting or easily
attainable. As the Court expressed in Bonito Boats, a patent results in a
limited protection. 8 This protection is limited in several dimensions.
First, the duration of the protection afforded by a patent is limited to
seventeen years for "utility" patents," 9 and to fourteen years for "design"
patents."9 Second, an invention must pass certain threshold requirements
before it is granted patent protection. These threshold requirements are that
an invention must be both novel' 91 and nonobvious.192
The novelty requirement operates to "exclude from consideration for
patent protection knowledge which is already available to the public."19
The novelty requirement expresses "a congressional determination that the
creation of a monopoly in... information [already available to the public]
would not only serve no socially useful purpose, but would in fact injure
the public by removing existing knowledge from public use."''
The nonobviousness requirement mandates that a "patent may not be
obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
an ordinary skill in the art ....,95
Thus, unless an idea embodied in an invention has not been available
to the public and unless the invention is sufficiently complex such that it
is not obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, the threshold require-
ments of novelty and nonobviousness are not satisfied and the "invention"
is not patentable. The Court summed this up when it said:
187. rd.
188. Id
189. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952) C"Every patent shall ... grant to the patentee.., for the term
of seventeen years ... the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States... .") (emphasis added).
190. Id. § 173 ("Patents for designs shall be granted for the term of fourteen years.")
(emphasis added).
191. See id § 102.
192. 1& § 103.
193. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148.
194. Id.
195. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
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Taken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements
express a congressional determination that the purposes behind
the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and
exploitation of either that which is already available to the public
or that which may be readily discerned from publicly available
material .... The federal patent system thus embodies a
carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and
disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology
and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the
invention for a period of years.'"
The Court in Bonito Boats further explained that "[tlhe novelty and
nonobviousness requirements of patentability embody a congressional
understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of
ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the
exception.""9 The Court stressed that it has "consistently reiterated the
teaching of [Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.]198 and [Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.]199 that ideas once placed before the public
without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without
significant restraint."
Although the Bonito Boats decision primarily concerned the issue of
whether state law may "offer substantial protection to utilitarian and design
ideas which the patent laws leave otherwise unprotected," ' the policies
of the patent laws articulated in that decision apply with equal force to
issues of trade dress protection. Indeed, the Court in Bonito Boats asserted
that "[t]rade dress is, of course, potentially the subject matter of design
patents. '' 7
Yet, opposing a long line of precedent, epitomized by the Bonito Boats
opinion, the Court in Two Pesos decided that a protection of unlimited
duration may be granted to Taco Cabana's trade dress. 3 Moreover, the
Court did not impose any requirement of novelty or nonobviousness before
granting this perpetual monopoly to Taco Cabana's trade dress. As such,
the Court did not heed its own principle that "free exploitation of ideas will
be the rule." Consequently, as it now stands, the Court will impose the
196. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
197. L at 151 (emphasis added).
198. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
199. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
200. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 (citation omitted).
201. Id at 143.
202. Id at 154.
203. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2761 (1992).
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stringent requirements of novelty and nonobviousness on the work of
inventors before conceding a time-limited monopoly on their inventions; but
for a trade dress, as commonplace as it may be, the Court will award a
timeless monopoly. Even worse, the Court in Two Pesos did not require
that the trade dress at issue have secondary meaning.2 As such, trade
dress can be awarded unlimited protection solely for its supposed creative
configuration which makes it "inherently distinctive." It may be argued
that the vastly different treatment of trade dress in Two Pesos and patents
in Bonito Boats is due to the different roles of trade dress and patents.
Trade dress, the argument may be advanced, serves as a source-identifier,
whereas a patent protects creative efforts. However, such a distinction
between "source-identification" and "creativeness" is too flimsy an
argument to result in an enormously inconsistent treatment for patents and
trade dress. The inconsistent treatments of the two is even more troubling
considering the Court did not even require that the trade dress have
secondary meaning if the trade dress was sufficiently creative.
Hence, in Two Pesos, the Court awarded an everlasting protection to
the creative aspects of a trade dress without requiring a concomitant source-
identifying quality. In effect, a more-than-patent protection has been
granted to a less-than-patentable creation.
VIII. REACHING THE DESIRED END
The Two Pesos decision exemplifies a situation where bad facts result
in bad law. Two Pesos restaurant, in its brief, made the stark admission
that 'qwo Pesos did in fact copy Taco Cabana's restaurant concept of an
upscale fast-food, Mexican restaurant with Mexican decor that also sells
alcoholic beverages and has a drive-thru . 20 This admission did
not, of course, go unnoticed by the Court. The Court pointed out that the
trial court "held that Two Pesos had intentionally and deliberately infringed
Taco Cabana's trade dress." 6 The Court also pointed out that the Court
of Appeals agreed with this holding: "'Two Pesos brazenly copied Taco
Cabana's successful trade dress ... 
204. Id. at 2756.
205. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. CL 2753
(1992) (No. 91-971), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
206. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2756.
207. Id at 2756 n.5 (quoting Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1127 n.20
(5th Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added).
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Courts heavily rely on evidence of intentional copying in finding an
infringement of a trademark or a trade dress. In fact, evidence of
intentional copying is one of the factors used to show that the copied mark
or dress has attained secondary meaning.' Thus, it may be argued that
finding Two Pesos liable for infringement of Taco Cabana's trade dress was
indeed the just result on the facts of this case. However, the Court reached
this result knowing that the trial court had already found that Taco
Cabana's trade dress had not acquired secondary meaning.' Further-
more, Taco Cabana had not challenged this finding of the trial court in its
brief to the Supreme Court.2 0 Therefore, the Court had an added
motivation to create its new principle-that a trade dress may be protectable
despite the lack of secondary meaning-in order to hold Two Pesos liable.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Court in 7Wo Pesos found that an "inherently distinctive" trade
dress need not acquire secondary meaning to be entitled to trademark
protection. Nevertheless, the Court failed to consider what constitutes an
"inherently distinctive" trade dress. Moreover, the Court did not address
the difficulty in the lower courts of applying the concept of "inherently
distinctive" trade dress to the facts before them.
The Court in Two Pesos departed from the well-developed and well-
understood test of secondary meaning employed by many lower courts to
avoid the difficulties of using the "inherently distinctive" trade dress
concept. Indeed the lower courts' decisions attest to the desirability of
resorting to the objective requirement of secondary meaning instead of the
amorphous concept of "inherently distinctive" trade dress.
The Court further failed to consider whether it is in fact possible for
trade dress to be categorized similarly to trademarks; namely, whether it is
possible to categorize trade dress as generic, descriptive, suggestive,
arbitrary or fanciful. This Note suggests that it is impossible to categorize
trade dress in the same fashion as trademarks and therefore the concept of
"inherently distinctive" trademark cannot and should not be imported to the
trade dress domain.
208. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
209. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2756.
210. Brief for Respondent, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (No.
91-971), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
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The Court in Two Pesos failed to consider the plights that the idea of
"inherently distinctive" trade dress would inject into the commercial world.
For example, the Court ignored the utility of the requirement of secondary
meaning in providing notice to the business community as to what
constitutes infringing conduct. Therefore, the decision leaves businesses
guessing as to whether they will suffer costly consequences by adopting a
certain trade dress.
Moreover, the Court's decision in Two Pesos contradicted a long line
of precedent in which the Court had carefully limited the scope of
protection granted to patents. The Court's decision in 7wo Pesos granted
a more-than-patent protection to a less-than-patentable creation.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Two Pesos was not well
supported by the case law, the text of the Lanham Act, or the congressional
intent in enacting the Lanham Act. Nor was the decision supported by the
general purpose of the trademark law "to protect the ability of consumers
to distinguish among competing producers."21' It appears that the
holding, that trade dress need not acquire secondary meaning to be afforded
trademark protection, was at least partially motivated by the desire to
punish Two Pesos for "brazenly copying" Taco Cabana's trade dress.
When all is said and done, the decision of the Court in 7wo Pesos
leaves trade dress law "to assume an ad hoc, separate and unduly expansive
life of its own, with predictable attending consequences: like some great




211. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
212. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. CL 2753
(1992) (No. 91-971), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
* The author dedicates this Note to the Editors and the Staff Members of the Entertainment
Law Journal for all their help and contribution toward completion of this Note.
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